1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	Civil Action No. 83-3882-Y
4	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
5	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, * *
6	Plaintiff, * *
7	v. * HEARING *
8	AVX CORPORATION, et al., *
	Defendants. *
9	COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, *
10	* Plaintiff, *
11	v. * *
12	AVX CORPORATION, et al., * *
13	Defendants. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
14	BEFORE: The Honorable William G. Young,
15	District Judge
16	APPEARANCES:
17	JEROME W. MacLAUGHLIN, BRADLEY L. LEVINE
18	and KEITH T. TASHIMA, Attorneys, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environmental and Natural
19	Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7611, Ben Franklin Station, Washington,
20	D.C. 20044, on behalf of the United States of America
21	MATTHEW BROCK, Assistant Attorney General,
22	Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Environmental Protection Division, One Ashburton
23	Place, Boston, Massachusetts 02108, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
24	
	1 Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts
25	September 18, 2013

1 APPEARANCES (Cont'd) 2 MAN CHAK NG and MAXIMILIAN BOAL, Enforcement Counsel, New England, Region 1, 3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 5 Post Office Square, Suite 100, Boston, Massachusetts 4 02109, on behalf of the Environmental Protection 5 Agency NUTTER, McCLENNEN & FISH LLP (By Mary K. 6 Ryan, Esq. and Cynthia M. Guizzetti, Esq.), 7 Seaport West, 155 Seaport Boulevard, Boston, Massachusetts 02210-2604 8 - and -ALSTON & BIRD LLP (By Douglas S. Arnold, 9 Esq. and Sarah T. Babcock, Esq. and Jonathan E. Wells, Esq.), One Atlantic Center, 1201 West 10 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3424, on behalf of AVX Corporation 11 KORRIN N. PETERSEN, ESQ., 114 Front Street, 12 New Bedford, Massachusetts 02740 - and -13 SUPER LAW GROUP LLC (By Reed W. Super, Esq.), 131 Varick Street, Suite 1033, New York, 14 New York 10013, on behalf of Buzzards Bay Coalition, Inc. 15 BEAUREGARD, BURKE & FRANCO (By Richard 16 Burke, Esq.), 32 William Street, New Bedford, Massachusetts 02740, on behalf of Town of 17 Acushnet, et al. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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               THE CLERK:
                           Now hearing Civil Matter 83-3882, the
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      United States of America, et al. v. AVX, et al.
               THE COURT: Well, good afternoon. Would counsel
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      identify themselves.
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               MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, Jerome MacLaughlin
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      for the United States. With me are Mr. Levine and Mr.
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      Tashima, both from the United States Department of Justice.
               MR. BROCK: Your Honor, Matt Brock for the
      Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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               MR. NG: Man Chak Ng from EPA.
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               MR. BOAL: Maximilian Boal from EPA.
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               MS. RYAN:
                         Mary Ryan, your Honor, for AVX
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      Corporation from Nutter McClennen & Fish.
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               MS. GUIZZETTI: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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      Cynthia Guizzetti, also for AVX Corporation, from Nutter,
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      McClennen & Fish.
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               MR. ARNOLD: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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      Arnold, for AVX Corporation, of Alston & Bird.
               MR. WELLS: Good afternoon. Jonathan Wells for AVX
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      Corporation, also with Alston & Bird.
               MR. SUPER: Good afternoon. Reed Super for
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      proposed intervenor, Buzzards Bay Coalition.
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               MS. PETERSEN: Good afternoon. Korrin Petersen,
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      also for the proposed intervenor, Buzzards Bay Coalition.
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               MR. BURKE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Richard
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Burke from Beauregard, Burke & Franco, for the proposed intervenor, Town of Acushnet, et al.

THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.

Now, I can't resist saying this, and it's not my practice to single out any attorney, and I welcome you all to this hearing. But I've got to say I welcome Ms. Ryan. I think, but I stand to be corrected, that she is the only one of you who was here in 1983 in the same position that she occupies now.

Is that unfair? Is there someone else I'm missing who was in on that case originally? Yes, Mr. Brock.

MR. BROCK: Yes, your Honor, but not in 1983.

THE COURT: If I didn't remember you, I apologize.

MR. BROCK: Not quite that far back, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RYAN: Mr. Brock was with the Commonwealth at the time leading up to the settlement, your Honor.

THE COURT: I see. Ms. Ryan was there in the beginning.

Now, let me, given the nature of this proceeding, ask, other than the proposed intervenors, are there other persons at this hearing -- you will all understand that I have read the entire record insofar as it relates to this proceeding -- are there other persons or entities that object to the way the named parties want to modify the

consent decree? Are there other objectors? All right.

Then hearing none, let me address the proposed intervenor Buzzards Bay and Acushnet. As I understand it, but I stand to be corrected, Acushnet is satisfied with the argument to be presented by Buzzards Bay.

Do you want to be heard separately?

MR. BURKE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I appreciate that.

Then let me face right up to this proposed intervention, because intervention in the circumstances of this case is a difficult and complex issue. And as a practical matter, I think the course I propose to follow is best on the grounds of practicality, though I have some significant reservation about this being precedent for intervention. And the practical result is this.

I want, having read their papers, I want to hear from them orally. I don't need to grant them the power to intervene to hear from them orally, and this is a manageable hearing to hear not only their written submissions, which I have read, but to hear their oral argument. So, just as a matter of my supervisory power and handling the case, I am going to hear from them.

Second, they want to have the right to appeal. And that requires a legal determination, but practically it doesn't make much difference as I see it. If I deny them

the right to appeal, they can appeal on the ground that my denial of their right to appeal is error. And I'm positive the court of appeals will at least entertain that claim. On the other hand, if I give them, if I allow them to intervene at least to have the right to appeal then you can say, all of you, the parties to the litigation, that my grant of the right, the grant of intervention was error, but either way the likelihood is there's going to be an appeal.

And so, I don't know that it makes much practical difference and I'm inclined to give them the right to appeal as a practical matter. And if that implicates saying that for those purposes they have a right to intervene, I'm inclined to allow it.

Now, I'm interested in the merits, but I'm also interested, how does that injure, as a practical or legal matter, how does that injure any right of the current litigants? If I don't give them intervention they'll appeal and you'll have to deal with that before the court of appeals. If I do, you can appeal and say I made a mistake.

Practically, does anyone have a problem with how I propose to proceed? We're not talking about evidentiary hearings or anything.

 $\mbox{\bf MR. ARNOLD:}\mbox{ Yes, your Honor, Doug Arnold on behalf}$ of AVX.

If the Court denies the Coalition's motion to

intervene then they would have a right to immediate appeal, you're absolutely correct, your Honor, and that issue would be taken up first by the First Circuit. If the Court, the First Circuit affirms the Court's ruling denying intervention then there will not be an appeal in the event the Court grants the government's motion to entry.

So, from a practical perspective our client believes that the right sequence would be for the Court to address the motion to intervene and if it's denied they will appeal it, and if the Court subsequently grants the government's motion then that will be appealed only if the First Circuit reverses the decision on intervention.

THE COURT: Isn't it more powerful the other way?

Shouldn't I structure things so the court of appeals will have the issues that are before me before it and then -- why burden them with two separate appeals? Let's say they win on the first one, then they attack it on the merits.

Assuming it goes your way. It may not.

MR. ARNOLD: Sure.

THE COURT: And you may be the ones appealing. So if you appeal then, naturally, you're going to say I should have granted this motion to modify the decree --

MR. ARNOLD: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- substantively and they'll be opposing. I just -- why shouldn't it just be one appeal,

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      one ball of wax?
                            Respectfully, your Honor, if you grant
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               MR. ARNOLD:
      both motions then there will be two appeals.
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               THE COURT:
                            Why?
               MR. ARNOLD: Because we will --
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               THE COURT: Oh, if I grant --
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               MR. ARNOLD: Grant them, yes, your Honor.
               THE COURT: -- both. All right, let's posit that.
      I grant both motions. I let them in, but I grant the, just
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      for purposes of discussion --
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               MR. ARNOLD: Correct.
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               THE COURT: -- I grant the present litigants'
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      motion to modify the decree.
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               MR. ARNOLD: Correct.
                                       Then there will be two
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      appeals.
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               THE COURT: Well, they'll be cross-appeals.
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               MR. ARNOLD: Correct. But essentially two rulings
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      upon review by the First Circuit. Conversely, if the Court
      denies their motion to intervene there potentially will be
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      only one appeal.
               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. ARNOLD: Because if that's affirmed then that's
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      the end of it.
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               THE COURT: Potentially there will, but, of course,
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      that's what they pay the court of appeals for.
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Recognizing -- and I want this very clear on the record -- recognizing the difficulty of the propriety of allowing intervention here, but acting in a fashion that the Court considers prudent, the Court allows the Coalition and Town of Acushnet motion for intervention for the purpose of hearing it today and allowing it to take an appeal, should it desire, or either of the parties, an appeal, should they desire, from the ruling of the Court, whatever it may be. That's the order.

Now, we're ready for argument. I think 15 minutes a side is sufficient because I have read the papers in some detail. It's the government's motion. This isn't 15 minutes a party, 15 minutes a side. So, you people work it out. I'll hear from whoever wants to speak.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, Jerome MacLaughlin for the United States. Mr. Brock from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will also present briefly to the Court. And 15 minutes will be sufficient for our side.

THE COURT: As welcome as Ms. Ryan and the others are they're going to go along with it. Right?

MS. RYAN: I'm sorry, your Honor. I was --

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: I'm sorry, your Honor.

MS. RYAN: I'm sorry. I think we missed -- I had one point on the intervention, but I'll get to that at the end of my argument.

THE COURT: But it's over. I've allowed the intervention for these purposes.

MS. RYAN: Your Honor, Acushnet, the Town of Acushnet never moved to intervene. They simply asked to be an amicus. So I don't -- certainly, your Honor, it's within your discretion.

THE COURT: Well, no, if that's all they asked for that's all they get. I just want someone to voice these, if we need it. I want one ball of wax. I've got one ball of wax. Acushnet -- I'm not manufacturing a motion they didn't make. They'll be treated as an amicus and they'll join in the brief of, they'll join in the argument of Buzzards Bay.

MS. RYAN: And, your Honor, would it assist the court of appeals if you clarified whether the intervention was permissive as of right or simply on the conditions that you indicated?

THE COURT: It's on the conditions I indicated.

MS. RYAN: Thank you, your Honor. Excuse me.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. MacLaughlin, I'll hear you.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, on the, back to on the merits.

Your Honor, there are four key facts about the Supplemental CD which affect the Court's consideration here, and I want to go through each of those four.

First, this is a settlement that obtains \$366.25

million cash from AVX under CERCLA. Second, these funds will reduce the time it takes EPA to clean up New Bedford Harbor from 40 down to five to seven years. Third, AVX is not performing any cleanup work here. This is just a cash-out settlement. EPA has been performing the cleanup for the past 20 years and the remedy that EPA is performing is not at issue in this motion or in the settlement.

And, your Honor, fourth, and finally, EPA, not AVX, is ultimately responsible for completing the work at this site. EPA has already removed one-third of the sediments as part of this cleanup. EPA has already committed, with Massachusetts support, \$215 million towards this cleanup, and EPA, along with the Commonwealth, will work towards completing the cleanup work on an accelerated schedule that the funds from the settlement will allow.

THE COURT: Of course there won't be any oversight, will there? You say it will be faster. But if I allow this modification, not that I need to intervene, but there have been these faithful reports over time telling me what's going on, and this cash-out settlement, I'm through then.

Correct?

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: There will not be court oversight, correct, your Honor. As opposed to -- you're referring to the Natural Resource Damages settlement from past times where the Court is periodically updated?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, before I get to the legal standards I did want to --

THE COURT: I mean, in all fairness, there have been these periodic reports that have been required, and though I don't hold hearings because you're all in agreement, I read matters that come to court. And I am sensitive that I've had this continuing jurisdiction. This proposal not only modifies the consent decree but in essence ends the Court's involvement. The federal government, supported by the Commonwealth, has the obligations that it has under statute with respect to this site and it's left to the Executive to carry out its duties under law and they're \$366 and-a-half million better off. But when you tell me it's going to be done much faster you're saying trust us it's going to be done much faster.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, to respond to your point about court oversight, the Natural Resource Damages, or NRD, that is in a separate account, it's in a court registry right now. That will continue on. That won't actually end. When I said the oversight will end, it is for the majority of the cleanup work, the actual dredging of sediments. There would be no further court involvement. In that aspect, the NRD would remain.

In addition, speaking to more generally the overall

cleanup, EPA as part of the government does maintain a website where it publicly updates the public on the goings on at the site. It has public hearings.

THE COURT: You act as though I meant that critically. I didn't. I simply want to be clear what we're doing. And you're being candid. But for Natural Resources Damages and the reports relative to that settlement, the Court's involvement, if I go for this, is at an end.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Unless AVX doesn't pay the money and then we'll be back before the Court. Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, I just want to address a couple of arguments that the Coalition raises. While the Coalition states that it is not challenging the remedy that EPA has selected through its administrative process, they repeatedly invite the Court to make determinations about the adequacy of the remedy in opposing this motion. For example, the Coalition asks the Court to find that the cleanup levels and the disposal locations in the remedy are deficient and inconsistent with CERCLA.

Your Honor, this remedy as I mentioned was selected through EPA's proper administrative procedures which have been followed. That remedy is not before the Court and the Court cannot review the remedy that has been selected and that EPA is performing.

Secondly, your Honor, the Coalition states that its

goal, if it is successful, is that it expects the Court would require the parties to rectify errors in the settlement and resubmit a new settlement to the Court.

Under their theory the settlement would not only require EPA to pay more money to come in line with their assumption that AVX is 100 percent liable for 100 percent of the cost, but also that we would have a new, unknown condition reopener and that we would have a new cost reopener. But, your Honor, that argument ignores the reality that the Supplemental CD is the result of a compromise between the United States, Massachusetts, and AVX. No party in a settlement gets everything it wants. What the Coalition is asking the Court to do is require AVX to give the governments everything they might want. That's simply not a settlement.

Your Honor, just briefly on the legal standards which are very clear here in the First Circuit. As stated in Cannons Engineering the Court considers whether the settlement is fair, second, reasonable, and third, consistent with the goals of the statute. Your Honor, the Supplemental CD that the United States and Massachusetts propose meet this test, particularly when viewed with a deference due to the governmental agency's role in crafting the settlement. The Supplemental Consent Decree is fair. It's both procedurally fair and substantively fair. It's

procedurally fair because we engaged in years long negotiations with AVX.

THE COURT: If you're dividing this up equally you have about a minute. Go ahead.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Thank you, your Honor. We're, we're not.

It's also substantively fair. Your Honor, this settlement at \$366.25 million will recover 90 percent of the future cost to clean up the site. No specific determination of the percent of liability of AVX is necessary for the Court's determination, nor has the Court ruled on what percent of liability AVX may have.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. I hope you won't take this question as an impertinent question, but the thought goes through my mind. None of this, you say this was a years long negotiation, none of this is driven, I imagine you're going to tell me, by the current impasse that has resulted in the systemwide sequestration of funds across the Executive, and indeed the Judiciary, but forget the Judiciary. I mean, one reason this is palatable is you've got cash in hand.

Now, we're clear we're going to use this cash for these purposes?

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Yes, your Honor. It goes into a special account which is only to be used for the New Bedford

Harbor Superfund site.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: And also, your Honor, to answer your earlier question, no, the negotiations were unconnected to the current issues with sequestration.

Your Honor, I did briefly want to mention litigation risks which factor into whether the settlement is reasonable. I'm sure AVX will speak to these litigation risks.

THE COURT: Well, I hadn't anticipated hearing from AVX, if I said 15 minutes a side. Now we're down to about six minutes. Divide it up as you see fit, but you're still going.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, just to be clear, 15 minutes for the US and AVX combined?

THE COURT: And the Commonwealth.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: I'm going to wrap up very quickly, your Honor, thank you.

Your Honor, just briefly, the United States does not believe that section 122(f) of CERCLA is binding on the Court. It provides guidance to the Court. It doesn't apply in this instance because this is a cash-out settlement. This is not a situation where AVX is performing work. The safeguards established in 122(f) are important and necessary when EPA has ceded that authority to the party. That is not

the situation here. It is factually different than that. So 122(f) does not apply.

Your Honor, this is a great settlement for the United States, we think it is fully briefed, and we ask the Court to rule as quickly as it can because the money is necessary for dredging at the site.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MacLAUGHLIN: With that, your Honor, I'll conclude and I'll ask Mr. Brock to speak.

MR. BROCK: Thank you, your Honor.

Briefly, I would like to focus on the third prong of the Cannons test which is that in the Commonwealth's view this settlement clearly is in the public interest and consistent with the goals of CERCLA.

With this settlement, your Honor, the Commonwealth expects at least three important benefits. The first Mr. MacLaughlin's already referred to is to expedite this settlement. Currently it is, with the current funding, your Honor, it's supposed to take 40 years. But with the settlement fund we expect this will be reduced to five to seven years.

Second, your Honor, we expect a significant reduction in the risk to public health and the environment by removing a significant amount of the PCBs that currently exist in that system.

And finally, New Bedford and Massachusetts should realize some important economic benefits. Once this cleanup is done and done relatively quickly, redevelopment opportunities should be available in New Bedford Harbor that have been precluded for decades.

Alternatively, your Honor, if you did deny this motion, we think the public interests clearly will suffer. The cleanup will be delayed, likely for years, potentially decades. The public health will still be put at risk on an extended basis. And Massachusetts taxpayers will potentially be liable for tens of millions of dollars in cleanup costs as part of the state's share of this Superfund cleanup which this settlement otherwise would cover.

So, given these factors, your Honor, we think clearly the public interest favors this settlement and we respectfully ask the Court to enter the decree.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Ryan?

MS. RYAN: Your Honor, I will emphasize only a few points. One is this issue of litigation risk which as you know is a factor under Cannons. We can speak to it perhaps better than the Department of Justice because we're the ones who would be making that.

The Coalition has focused on the substantive fairness or accountability of the settlement, whether the

settlement is adequate compensation to the public because of the percentage that AVX is paying. As the government has correctly pointed out, AVX is paying at least 90 percent, our calculation is 95 percent of the future cleanup costs. But the Coalition says what about the past costs. And that relates to our litigation defenses, your Honor. As to the past costs, again, the Coalition emphasizes that the costs in this case goes from a \$33 million estimate in 1992 to the current calculation of \$830 million. Using, for example, the 130 million cost estimate in the record of decision in 1998, \$700 million difference. You know, it's almost a res ipsa loquitur case, Judge. In the private sector you don't get away with a cost overrun of \$700 million without a lot of explaining to do. So that's one aspect of our defense is essentially to put the government on trial to explain how they did that, and our contention is that they did it by not following the NCP.

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We also have briefed the issue of the reopeners and whether they can be properly invoked. The cost reopener involves construing the consent decree, taking into account the importance of net present value of calculations. The standard reopener will be simple fact questions for the Court to consider.

On the liability front, Mr. MacLaughlin's already mentioned that AVX has never been adjudicated liable. One

big difference between now and 1992 is that the U.S. Supreme Court, if you will, has breathed, we hope, some new life into the divisibility doctrine under the Burlington Northern case. AVX, if found liable, and it's obviously not conceding that, would seek to reduce its liability by looking to the conduct of the Army Corps of Engineers and spreading contamination around the harbor when they did the dredging. Same with the highway department. Same with the City of New Bedford when it released contaminants into the harbor through sewers and publicly-owned treatment works. The litigation will not be simple.

Perhaps the most important issue for me to address, however, your Honor, is the consistency with CERCLA. In some respects --

THE COURT: About a minute left. Go ahead.

MS. RYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Two things. One, it's wishful thinking on the Coalition's part to think that AVX will renegotiate. I would refer you to the affidavit of AVX's CFO who says that given the past history of this case finality is a requisite for them to enter the settlement. It's the linchpin of the settlement.

Your Honor, the second point is a legal argument.

Your Honor carefully analyzed 122 in Acushnet IV. You said
the language of the statute, the legislative intent means

that clearly it was intended only to apply to performance settlements, but you said I think congressional intent requires me to apply certain provisions. Your Honor, what we would argue and hopefully have argued to your satisfaction is that in this case congressional intent does not require that. It's the opposite, that you need to recognize finality, you need to deviate from the way other settlements might have been done in the past, to allow this settlement to proceed.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll hear Buzzards Bay.

MR. SUPER: Your Honor, thank you for hearing from us today.

The government says that the remedy is not at issue, not before the Court. In fact, it is before the Court. And it's not just the Coalition that's put it there, it's congress and the First Circuit.

Three of the public interest factors in section 122(f)(4), that's (A), (B) and (E) --

THE COURT: They say it doesn't apply. Don't we have to get it to apply first?

MR. SUPER: They say that it's guidance. They say that the -- well, they say that the public interest factors do apply to see whether the consent decree is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.

THE COURT: But their argument prescinds from Cannons, not from the statutory framework and that, from their point of view, is a difference. Your argument, contrariwise, if I understand it, is that, and you started off that way, that congress, acting through 122(f), requires certain things of me. Deal with why they say the statute doesn't apply here. MR. SUPER: Yes, I can deal with 122, but it all comes back to Cannons. Because also, even if they're right

comes back to Cannons. Because also, even if they're right and 122 doesn't apply, your Honor still has to consider the effectiveness of the remedy.

THE COURT: Oh, I agree with that.

MR. SUPER: Okay.

THE COURT: Don't waste your time on that. I agree I do.

MR. SUPER: Okay. But the government's first point was that the remedy is not at issue, and most of their papers were saying that the remedy is not. I'm glad that the Court agrees with us that the remedy is at issue.

THE COURT: Well, I have to consider the effectiveness.

Go ahead.

MR. SUPER: Okay. The reason why we believe 122(f)(3), that's the requirement that a covenant not to sue not take effect until after the remedial action is

certified, and 122(f)(6) that requires, except in extraordinary circumstances, requires reopeners, those provisions apply because the text of those provisions said that it applies. The touchstones under those provisions are where a settlement resolves future liability to the U.S. That's an unambiguous term. Clearly this settlement resolves future liability. There must be remedial action. But remedial action is a term defined in CERCLA, also defined in the '92 consent decree, broadly to include both government cleanups and PRP claims. The term cash-out settlement appears nowhere in CERCLA, nor does cleanup settlement appear in CERCLA.

The government's argument, and AVX joins in that, is not grounded at all in the statutory text. Their argument that 122(f) does not apply is based entirely on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hercules. There are a few other cases cited. None of them have any analysis of the statute. Those, and there are very few of them, they all follow Hercules. And Hercules took a very broad, simplistic approach and concluded that subsections (a) through (f) of 122 do not apply at all to what the Court said, and again made up this term cleanup settlements as opposed to cash-out settlements. But that's not what the statute said. And whatever one thinks of section 122, clearly congress did not make it as cut and dried as Hercules makes it out to be.

I'll point the Court to --

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THE COURT: Well, what about what I said in

Acushnet IV? Isn't that, can't that be harmonized with

Hercules?

MR. SUPER: In Acushnet IV, your Honor, the Court was, of course, dealing with a Natural Resource Damages settlement.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. SUPER: And that is covered in a separate section of 122. And 122(h), which covers what CERCLA calls cost recovery zones, is particularly instructive. brought a complaint only under section 107 of CERCLA for cost recovery then the provisions that we are bringing to bear would not apply at all. It would be section (h) and it would be section (i) that applies the public participation requirements for such settlements. But subsections (f) and (d) which applies the public participation requirements for this kind of settlement were specifically cited by the government and AVX in the Supplemental Consent Decree. Now, in the briefs they say, well, we cited them just to show that what we did is consistent with those sections. not saying they apply. But in one case they said pursuant to, which apparently means that they believe that they apply.

If the Court looks at various factors. For

example, public interest factor (G), in that one congress asks whether the remedial action will be carried out in whole or in significant part by the responsible parties themselves. If (f) applied only to PRP carried out cleanups congress wouldn't have asked that question.

Similarly, if you go up to 122(b)(3), and this is within the range of provisions that Hercules said do not apply to, quote, unquote, cleanup, cash-out settlements, congress asked if, as part of any agreement, the President will be carrying out any action and the parties would be paying amounts to the President. So, clearly congress contemplated a variety of different types of agreements that would be subject to sub-provisions (a) through (f). It's not as clean as the government would have it. And really it's not the type of settlement that's at issue, it's the type of relief that the government sought in the complaint.

Let me turn to Cannons, because your Honor asked about that, and at page 89 where the panel was starting to talk about reasonableness, and let me just read out a sentence from this. It says the first facet of reasonableness of the decree's likely efficaciousness -- that's Judge Selya -- as a vehicle for cleansing the environment is of cardinal importance. Except in cases which involve only recoupment of cleanup costs already spent, the reasonableness of the consent decree, for this

purpose, will basically be a question of technical adequacy, primarily concerned with the probable effectiveness of the proposed remedial responses.

There's two very important aspects to that quote.

One is that the Court was drawing a line between consent decrees that merely recoup costs already expended, which is not what this one is. As Mr. MacLaughlin pointed out, these moneys will go to fund the future cleanup. And the second important point, and as your Honor has said, you do have to consider the effectiveness of the remedy. The remedy is entirely uncertain at this point.

Just to run down a couple of points. EPA has said they don't know how much PCB sediments need to be dredged because they're still finding it in the marshes and sediments. That was just a couple of years ago. They don't know what levels they'll be dredging to because the land uses have changed. Twenty years ago when this case started, New Bedford was not the same city it is now with a lot more residential and recreational use.

THE COURT: But isn't what they have argued, especially what the Commonwealth itself has argued, doesn't that resonate as a practical matter? Isn't the -- what you're asking this Court to do in essence is start all over again and look at the matter today. This was settled after considerable pretrial preparation and thought. And the

settlement has been whatever it has been over the intervening years. There is a value to finality, isn't there?

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MR. SUPER: This was settled 20 years ago with reopeners because your Honor told the parties in Acushnet IV, and in the hearing that followed, that reopeners were critically important. They remain critically important.

We're not asking anyone to go back to the beginning. And we recognize the value of settlement and finality. But more important here, and congress and the First Circuit have said it in giving the Court the factors to apply, that the effectiveness of the remedy, as well as corrective justice, fairness and the polluter paying, but particularly the effectiveness of the remedy is the most important factor. And we contend it will be premature to release AVX. Not only do we not know the amount of sediment to be dredged and to what level, the government doesn't know where to dispose of it yet because the off-site disposal option, the containment audit disposal option and the shoreline disposal option, are still to be examined in a focused feasibility study. So we don't know what to dredge, to what level, where to put it. We don't know the effectiveness of some of those solutions, such as burying it in aquatic disposal sites, and the cost for all of that isn't overrunning the cost by dramatic amounts all along, we

don't know what the remedy's going to be so we don't know what the costs are, and we don't know what the costs of even the current components are.

THE COURT: Doesn't that, doesn't that feed into AVX's own argument about litigation risks here. You say there's been such dramatic cost overruns. The EPA will still bear the responsibility as the responsible agency and it will have this fund of \$366 and-a-half million, and they say, anyway, they will move more rapidly than has been the case under the consent decree I approved.

MR. SUPER: As the Court said at the beginning, they're asking us to trust them and the track record hasn't shown them to be worthy of that kind of trust. We want to see the harbor cleaned up faster than anyone. But we don't -- we are nowhere near five to seven years from being done. That's wishful thinking at best. We're a long way from being done. And all we're asking for is reopeners that if needed would keep AVX on the hook to pay their fair share.

In, in the original settlement --

THE COURT: But I'm always trying to look at it practically. I understand why you would want that. But how would you ever settle one of these cases then? Aren't you looking to a regime where a cash-out settlement is impossible?

1 MR. SUPER: No, it's not impossible, your Honor.

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And 20 years ago when they presented the Court with a settlement that didn't have reopeners you sent them back and they revised the settlement and came back with one with reopeners. That can be done again. AVX says they won't -they want finality. They won't settle with reopeners. Well, there is a reopener here. A Natural Resource Damage reopener. So, they are willing to live with certain reopeners it appears. They've signed, they've signed this document. And if the Court rejects this settlement both parties will have to go back to the negotiating table or take a hard look at it and decide whether to negotiate or whether to litigate. But letting them off the hook prematurely means that the government will necessarily run out of funds to fund this cleanup. There is just no way it can be done under the time frame predicted and those costs given the track record, given the uncertainty.

THE COURT: But the government as the primary agency responsible is willing to undertake that risk.

MR. SUPER: The government, I can't speak for the government's motivation, but they seem to be jumping at what is admittedly a large sum of money and willing to forgo the long-term future of the harbor and the cleanup. At the end of the day, we and others can challenge the record. And the question of whether the cleanup is adequate will be squarely

before the Court not only to determine whether settlement's adequate but whether more cleanup is required. And at that point if the Court says more cleanup is required there will be no more money from the primary polluter to cover it.

Even before then the money's going to run out.

THE COURT: But I am supposed to give these proposals deference to the skill and good faith -- I'm not getting into matters of trust -- good faith of the Executive agency that's supposed to understand these things. And that's why we're before a Court, because I must take into account the public interest. But I'm supposed to do it with some deference to the judgment of the people who bear the obligation to act here.

Doesn't this fit within those parameters?

MR. SUPER: Well, you have, the public interest is the primary concern.

THE COURT: It is. You're right there.

MR. SUPER: And what's being lost is not only the Court oversight but the funding from the primary polluter, the only party that has the wherewithal to fund this cleanup. And it would be premature to relieve them of that.

Yes, the parties have negotiated, you know, this settlement. But that was done under the assumption that they could forgo the reopeners and put a covenant on it so that it becomes effective in two years. If that is not the

case, if this Court tells them that is not allowed it changes the landscape on which they negotiate. And that is exactly what happened 20 years ago.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SUPER: Thank you, your Honor.

extraordinarily well aided by all the briefing in this case. These are responsible parties, both the federal government, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in its briefing in this iteration, I think AVX is to be praised for its candor and thoroughness, and equally, putting aside the iffiness, if you will, of formal intervention, as to which this Court candidly admits uncertainty, the Buzzards Bay Coalition here has done a fine job. It is what one would want to see on behalf of interested citizens and entities in vetting the proper considerations that should be before the Court. And I express my appreciation for their brief and for the able argument that's been presented here this afternoon.

That said, I don't see a reason to stay my hand here. The Court approves the Supplemental Consent Decree and approves this settlement as proffered by the United States, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and by AVX.

While I reserve my right to file a more thorough explication with respect to the legal reasoning, the major aspects that drive the Court's conclusions are, as follows,

and should permit an adequate basis for appellate review should any be sought.

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I do not read what this Court said in this case in Acushnet IV as contrary to the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Hercules and I rule as matter of law that section 122(f) is not applicable by its terms to this case. The primary driver of this Court's analysis is the controlling decision of the First Circuit in Cannons Engineering. The Court especially takes into account the litigation risk. On the record as I have reviewed it, there is here some significant litigation risk to the federal and state entities that is appropriate for compromise. But most important, and the most important aspect that drives this Court's ruling is this Court's careful consideration. On the basis of the entire record, this Court finds and rules that this settlement is in the public interest given the situation that obtains today. The extent of the cash in hand, the fact that this will be carefully segregated, and the Court expects that, the moneys will be used for the cleanup remedy, the Court's appropriate deferences to the federal agency as to the selection and accomplishment of that remedy, and the appropriate interest in finality all properly represent a public interest that favors this settlement. It is so ordered.

I do thank you all very much. We'll recess.

1	COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.
2	THE CLERK: All rise.
3	(Whereupon the matter concluded.)
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7	CERTIFICATE
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10	I, Donald E. Womack, Official Court Reporter for
11	the United States District Court for the District of
12	Massachusetts, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages
13	are a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand notes
14	taken in the aforementioned matter to the best of my skill
15	and ability.
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